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 EDGAR ILLAS 
 Survival, or, the War Logic of Global Capitalism 
 
 
     Perhaps the logic of global capitalism is no longer cultural but has evolved 
into a logic of war. As Fredric Jameson and David Harvey, among many others, 
taught us, financial capitalism unfolded in the second half of the twentieth 
century based on a logic of difference that produced cultural and spatial 
identities throughout the globe. Capital itself functions according to a 
differential logic by which it expands as a multiplicity of phenomena that 
conceal the internal driving force of accumulation. In postmodernity, however, 
this logic became particularly tangible as localities, cities, nations and all types 
of spaces and communities were forced to develop distinctive qualities that 
attracted the investments and flows of global capital. Postmodern culture was 
thus fully subsumed in the production and marketing of difference. As Jameson 
wrote, we had “a prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm, 
to the point at which everything in our social life—from economic value and 
state power to practices and to the very structure of the psyche itself—can be 
said to have become ‘cultural’ in some original and yet untheorized sense” 
(Jameson 1991, 48). 
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      While this process is still operative today, a different aspect seems to play 
the dominant role. This aspect is the war logic of globalization. Globalization 
appeared in the 1990s as the consolidation of a single world market, the 
establishment of post-Cold War peace, the successful union of capitalism and 
democracy, and the technological development that would make possible the 
interconnectedness of the globe. But in the 2000s, and especially after 9/11, 
globalization has shown a darker side: multiple forms of state and transnational 
violence have not proven exceptional moments of conflict, but the normal 
functioning of the system. Violence does not interrupt the smooth course of 
globalization; on the contrary, the global world needs to be in a constant state 
of emergency in order to function in an effective and profitable way. 
     Many theorists have described the unprecedented nature of this new state of 
war. For Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, globalization has turned war into a 
“permanent social relation” and has effaced the traditional distinction between 
politics and warfare (Hardt and Negri 2004, 12). Hardt and Negri emphasize 
three characteristics of the global state of war: the unlimited extension of 
conflict, both spatially and temporally; the intermingling of domestic and 
international politics; and the diffusion of the Schmittian distinction between 
friend and enemy (14-5). A certain ambiguity, however, traverses their 
narrative. On the one hand, they locate the origin of global war in the shift 
from modern warfare to biopolitical warfare, that is, in the emergence of 
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 twentieth century biopolitical control of populations and bodies through state 
apparatuses. For Hardt and Negri, the technologization of death that 
culminated in Auschwitz and Hiroshima represents the full capture of social life 
by biopolitical control and destruction. On the other hand, they present a 
historical difference between twentieth-century wars and global war when they 
observe that the latter, starting with George Bush’s 1991 Persian Gulf War, 
constitutes a “project to create a ‘new world order’”(24). In this respect, a 
fundamental difference separates the two historical phases, and the complete 
destructiveness of total war has been supplemented by a certain constructive 
impulse of global war. Global war is constructive to the extent that it 
permanently redefines the spaces of globalization and rearranges the 
distribution of sovereign power.1 
     In his analysis of Marxist reflections on violence, Étienne Balibar connects 
different forms of social and political warfare to the historical development of 
capitalism. For him, while the processes of primitive accumulation led to 
imperial colonization, and the necessity of an industrial reserve army has 
successively produced and eliminated excess populations, global violence is 
related to the stage of the real subsumption of labor under capital. Thus, the 
commodification of all forms of labor-power results in “a situation of endemic, 
anarchic or anomic violence (a ‘molecular’ civil war, Enzensberger would say), 
which capitalism tries to control by incorporating a multiplicity of apparatuses 
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 of control and ‘risk management’ (in Robert Castels’s phrase) into its social-
policy toolkit” (Balibar 2009, 112). Endemic violence has the creative-
destructive role of reproducing capital through the endless production and 
destruction of people and labor. 
     Carlo Galli draws up a different historical typology of war based on 
Schmittian spatio-political categories. He divides modern war in three phases. 
First, the classic wars between nation-states within the Westphalian legality of 
the Jus Publicum Europaeum correspond to what Clausewitz called “real absolute 
war” (Galli 2010, 142).2 In this phase, wars were limited conflicts between 
national enemies, in which states controlled the monopoly on violence and 
mobilized their peoples to protect… their own peoples. However contradictory 
this might have seemed, war had a distinct rationale, namely the protection of 
the national body against other national enemies. Second, what Raymond Aron 
called the “total wars” of the twentieth century led to mass destruction in both 
social and individual spheres.3 The rationale of war was no longer protection 
but irrational destruction. Galli observes that, despite their genocidal log ic, total 
wars still produced a primary spatial difference between “friend” and “enemy,” 
which resulted in the bipolarity of the Cold War. Without a proper national 
distribution of sovereignty, conflict was defined within the frame of tensions 
between the American and Russian superpowers. 
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      In global war, in contrast, we no longer find a clear difference between the 
spaces of the friend and the spaces of the enemy. For Galli, global war involves 
no telos and no division between internal and external spaces. Global war is the 
inherent obverse of globalization, in which “every local point become[s] an 
immediate function of a single global Totality (the principle of ‘glocality’)” 
(155). Globalization is “at every point, an immediate short-circuit between local and 
global” (160), which generates a “contradiction without system” (163) and 
makes violence a boundless mode of being. The difference between this 
situation and total war is that the latter was based on total mobilization and “ the 
immediate militarization of society,” whereas global war entails “the global socialization 
of violence” (174).4 
 
From Recognition to Survival 
     The transformation of violence into a social relation has destabilized a 
central paradigm for political and theoretical practices. Whereas under the 
cultural logic of late capitalism the recognition of all types of differences and 
the unearthing of heterodox, queer, marginal and subaltern subjectivities were 
the main driving forces of critical efforts, in the new conjuncture recognition is 
no longer the last horizon of cultural and social politics. Under the war logic of 
globalization, another regime has become dominant: the regime of survival. 
5
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      Two determinations conflated in the task of cultural recognition. First, the 
cultural logic of capital established a market of identities that made possible the 
recognition of multiple subject positions that had been previously invisible or 
nonexistent. Second, the destruction of total war in the twentieth century made 
imperative that an ethical task of recognition worked against the 
disappearances, forgetting, and repression it caused everywhere. Recognition 
encompassed, on the one hand, ethical work against the effects of total war 
and, on the other, an opening to the possibilities offered by the new 
postmodern marketplace.5 
     I will now focus on three important aspects of the regime of survival. These 
aspects are the new antagonistic relation between life and death; the post-
katechontic nature of survival; and the overcoming of the modern paradigms of 
convivance and biopolitics. 
     The contemporary regime of survival contends with a new reality of life and 
death. While in the last decades of the twentieth century cultural recognition 
attempted to give visibility to what total war had erased, an effort that could 
generate positive effects, like reparation or affirmation, or more aporetic ones, 
like the impossibility of bridging the gap between visibility and invisibility 
amidst the infinite dimensions of justice, survival copes instead with the fact 
that, within global war, life and death are two absolute conditions, with no 
possible bridge or dialogue between them. A different logic is in effect: whereas 
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 between visibility and invisibility there was once a movement of approximation 
and potential conciliation, between life and death today there is absolute 
distance, with no room for possible negotiation or compromise. Death 
produced by total war resulted in cultural exclusion and social destruction. As 
psychoanalysis and trauma studies have shown, death once marked the 
beginning of endless chains of haunting specters and mourning acts.6 Death 
under global war, in contrast, is as constituent as life. It is as destructive as it is 
constructive. It is not hidden but fully apparent and exposed. 
     The logic of recognition established a relation of otherness toward death. In 
The Inoperative Community, Jean-Luc Nancy analyzes the (non-)relation by which 
subjects and communities reveal themselves through death. To the extent that 
death cannot be sublated as an operative element of communities (such as 
culture, nation, blood, soil, family, humanity, etc.), communities are the 
phantasmatic result of their own internal inoperativity in relation to death. In 
Nancy’s words, “[c]ommunity is calibrated on death as on that of which it is 
precisely impossible to make a work” (Nancy 1991, 15). Thus, death both 
constitutes and deconstitutes the internal otherness of the subject and the 
community. 
     Nancy’s theorization of the inoperative community opposes the 
communitarian logic of total wars. He explicitly refers to the logic of Nazism as 
the most extreme example of the attempt to exterminate the internal death of 
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 the community (12). This logic contained a central contradiction: that the 
ultimate rationale of total war was to eliminate death itself as the internal other 
that makes the community inoperative. Total war, in other words, projected 
this inherent otherness onto a concrete collective (the Jews but also subsequent 
components such as the sick, the homosexuals, the gypsies, etc.) and proceeded 
to exterminate them to save the community from itself. Nancy’s effort 
consisted in recognizing this “destructive” inoperativity so as to dismantle the 
really destructive, or genocidal, logic of total war. 
     Under the regime of survival, the relation of individuals and communities to 
death does not follow a structure of otherness but of absolute antagonism. 
When war is both destructive and constructive, life and death are 
indistinguishable and yet fully separated. Death is a transcendental and also 
banal event, overexposed and yet overlooked, real and virtual at the same time. 
Death has no function in the structuring of social life other than being 
productive elimination. Death is ultimately all that happens and is the complete 
absence of eventness. Survival is therefore the task of escaping death and 
establishing no connection to it. To establish a connection with it would imply 
the automatic destruction of the connection, and of the living being. 
     But we should not understand the new conjuncture of global as a return to a 
pre-political stage where homo homini lupus est. Global war is not the war of every 
man against every man, in which, as in Hobbes’s famous phrase, there is 
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 “continual fear and danger of violent death, and [where] the life of man [is] 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1994, Ch. XIII, para. 9). In 
Hobbes’s narrative, the natural war of all against all constitutes the incentive to 
form common powers to which humans transfer their individual rights for the 
protection of their lives. The contractual basis of the political, therefore, 
pursues “the security of a man’s person, in his life and in the means of so 
preserving life as not to be weary of it” (XIV, 8).  
     Contemporary survival is not a natural state previous to the establishment 
of sovereign power. In fact, we may define it as the exact opposite, that is, as 
the post-political condition that results from the crumbling of the modern form 
of sovereign protection or, in other words, from the end of the state’s 
monopoly on violence. It is well-known that state apparatuses are no longer the 
exclusive supplier of protection, as the privatization of security forces, the 
externalization of social services, or the professionalization of armies have 
transferred public services to a variety of civil agencies that go from private 
militias of the Blackwater-type to NGOs. But this transference is only the most 
visible aspect of the dissolution of the state system of protection of the life of 
its subjects. In our global conjuncture, the absence of an indisputable sovereign 
power that can contain antagonistic violence and limit the spaces of life and 
death produces a sense of permanent threat and an apocalyptic structure of 
feeling. Global war entails the end of Schmitt’s katechon, that is, the demise of 
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 “the power that prevents the long-overdue apocalyptic end of times from 
already happening now” (qtd. in Hell 2009, 283).7 
     In this situation, survival is an unregulated struggle to live on, with no form 
of governmentality that directs it and no katechontic principle that controls it. 
This struggle, again, may be irrational, but is also economically productive and 
politically constituent. Against the charge of irrationality, one often encounters 
the idea that the so-called “survival of the fittest” encapsulates the 
governmentality of our times. The premise is that we inhabit a sort of capitalist 
jungle in which only the strong survive and where, as Guns’n’Roses used to 
sing, “ya learn to live like an animal in the jungle where we play” (Guns’n’Roses 
1987). Yet the problem with this idelogeme is not so much that it justifies the 
colossal inequalities produced by economic competition, but rather that it 
applies the rational template of the law of the stronger on a global reality in 
which the rationalities of modernity have imploded. In this respect, the 
“survival of the fittest” is a remnant of modernity that tries to make sense of a 
reality in which neither the nineteenth-century rationalities of progress, the 
enlightenment, or the defense of national interests, nor the twentieth-century 
anti-rationalities of total destruction and genocide, can organize the temporality 
of the period. 
     Thus, the logic of survival that we are theorizing here does not refer to the 
post-evental condition of those who come out alive from a war or those who 
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 win in an economic battle. Rather, it defines an ongoing and productive life 
conditioned by the presence of immediate catastrophe. It is an endless state of 
war and peace with no katechontic borders separating the two spaces. Survival 
takes place not in the pre-political war of all against all, but in a fully political 
war against war, a war against itself, a war that is both catastrophic and 
constructive. 
     In this context, political practices are no longer oriented toward the modern 
question of convivance and living together, but, as French anthropologist Marc 
Abélès writes, they result from what he calls “the interiorization of the survival 
problem” (Abélès 2010, xv). For Abélès, the reflections and practices that go 
from Hobbes to Keynes, from the construction of the Leviathan to the 
implementation of the welfare state, aimed at finding the best possible political 
form for the organization of the living together of human beings. Within 
globalization, in contrast, “the political field finds itself overrun by a gnawing 
interrogation concerning the uncertainty and threats that the future possesses” 
(15). 
     Abélès points at major aspects of what he calls “the politics of survival.” He 
argues that citizens have interiorized the distressing fact that “they will never 
again be ‘sheltered’ from the threats of distant places” (44). Everybody has 
understood that we live in a society of risk, where the state is no longer a firm 
“power of assistance” or “an insurance concerning the future” (103). He 
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 mentions the European Union as a revealing example of a postnational entity 
oriented toward a future with no clear and definite goals, an entity that 
exemplifies the situation of all nation-states in the global world. Finally, Abélès 
also observes that the temporality of survival is not that of the “afterwards” of 
“those who have overcome the gravest peril;” instead, it corresponds to a 
forward-looking fear caused by the “uncertainty of a possibly futureless 
tomorrow” (104). 
     Abélès explains the transition from modern convivance to postmodern 
survival in terms of biopolitics, and he defines “survival” the “biopolitical 
dimension” (16) of neoliberal governmentality. But in this step we can detect 
the inadequacy of the Foucauldian paradigm to understand the present of 
global war. 
     Foucault defines the biopolitical regulation of life as the essence of modern 
power or, more precisely, biopower. The imperative of the biopolitical state is 
“to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die” (Foucault 2003, 241), that is, to regulate life and 
pursue the disciplining and subsequent purification of the social body for the 
extraction of surplus labor. It is true that, in Foucault, biopolitics do not lead to 
a positive organization of convivance but rather to a system of terror of which 
the Nazi state is “the paroxysmal development” (259). Yet biopolitics do not 
engage in the governance of future uncertainty like the global polit ics of 
survival. The biopolitical state of terror maintains the horizon of convivance to 
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 the extent that it pursues the purification of the community and the species. 
Within biopolitics, as Foucault writes, “the death of the other, the death of the 
bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something 
that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer” (255). Despite its 
aberrant and contradictory content, this governmental premise still functions 
within the modern coordinates of social convivance. 
     To put it in other terms, if we assume that Nazism constitutes the extreme 
example of biopolitical destruction but also the beginning of a new paradigm of 
survival, then we must also assume that, as Abélès implies, there is a direct 
political link between the Holocaust conceived as a humanitarian problem and 
the multiple humanitarian crises (related to ethnic cleansing, climate change, 
migration, war, terrorism, etc.) that we experience in the global world. Indeed, 
for Abélès, survival and humanitarianism emerge at the moment when power 
adopts the right “to determine who should and who  should not inhabit the 
world” (147), which, as is known, is how Hannah Arendt describes the 
rationale of the Nazi banal evil. Therefore, for Abélès, the political structure of 
survival conceives all global conflicts as humanitarian crises and justifies all 
political action through humanitarian ends. 
     But, again, the genocidal logic of the biopolitical state was not oriented 
toward the administration of future uncertainty. Systematic massacring did not 
pursue the control of future threats, but continued to organize convivance by 
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 means of a radical extirpation of the perverted and inoperative elements of the 
population. For this reason, if the contemporary regime of survival is not about 
organizing communal living-together, then it cannot be biopolitical. For better 
or worse, biopower is not the primary catalyzer of the new world order.8 
 
Survival as Intervention 
     We have so far examined the logic of survival in rather negative terms. The 
three aspects regarding the antagonism between life and death, the post-
katechontic condition and the overcoming of biopolitics, describe what is no 
longer valid but not what is new in the new conjuncture. Now we must focus 
on the productive energies of the regime of survival and change the gloomy 
tone of our account for a more joyful register. 
     Survival involves continuous interventions. The interiorization of survival 
by individuals, which is a way of inserting the work of the state into one’s 
subjectivity (an insertion that, again, is not biopolitical but rather post -
katechontic), compels everyone to play a protective but also entrepreneurial role 
in the social field. In this respect, survival takes multiple forms of intervention. 
It may consist in the direct attack on other positions that are not necessarily 
dominant or oppressive, but that are perceived as threats in a given moment. It 
may be the effort to protect an inherited body of knowledge against external 
contamination or internal dissent. It can operate as preemptive manhunt that 
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 neutralizes future conflicts. It can develop guerrilla tactics, with hide-and-seek 
movements and specific targets. It can consist of a mafia politics based on 
friendship and alliances of common interests. It can take the shape of a covert 
operation in the sphere of infowar and cyberwar. It can build on ideological 
interpellation and mystification. It can be firmly active or it can be passive-
aggressive. It can be violent or non-violent, physical or symbolic, melodramatic 
or unspectacular, real or virtual, or a combination of both, or a synthesis of all 
of the above. 
     This brief list of forms is indicative of one central aspect: the neutral 
ideology of the work of survival. Survival is neither progressive nor reactionary; 
it is indeterminate and generic. It is a standard principle imposed on all political 
and critical interventions, and yet it does not make interventions indifferent to 
the world. On the contrary, the work of survival transforms all social practices 
into interventionist practices. Each individual and collective action becomes 
effectively militant and activist. 
     In the first stage of globalization, during the euphoric years of 
postmodernism, Reagan, Thatcher, and Fukuyama’s “end of history,” an 
opposition traversed the space for cultural and theoretical practice: the 
opposition between identity politics and subaltern critique. The recognition of 
different subjective positions and new identities constituted the dominant 
horizon of critical and political interventions. In a relation of 
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 inclusion/exclusion vis-à-vis this process of recognition, subalternism 
questioned the hegemonic articulations required to play the game of 
multiculturalism and identity politics. Subalternism aimed to give justice to the 
residues that could not be incorporated into this game, and it practiced an 
aporetic exercise in recognizing what could not be recognized. Multiculturalism 
and subalternism were the terms of a suprastructural discussion built on two 
historical changes: the end of total war and the transformation of the nation 
state into the corporate state. Specifically, these transformations involved the 
replacement of national cultures by multicultural diversity, and offered the 
possibility of imagining an end to war alongside utopian and alternative spaces 
beyond the state. 
     In our second, post-9/11 stage of globalization, in which the euphoria of 
postmodernity has been replaced by the permanent state of emergency of 
global war, 
the opening process of cultural recognition has turned into the activist 
intervention for the common survival. This shift should not be interpreted as a 
clear-cut break, but as a shift of valences or as an Althusserian tendential law. 
But a crucial difference lies between recognition and survival. While 
recognition involved a variety of actions oriented toward making the invisible 
visible, speaking truth to power, bearing witness to the ashes of total 
destruction and writing the unnameable names of the subaltern, the 
16
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 interventions of survival pursue their own effacement in a realm of full 
visibility and control. 
     In fact, one is tempted to say that survival is the opposite of recognition. 
Instead of bearing witness to the erased traces, the challenge now is to erase the 
traces that one leaves when moving through the “modulations” of the society 
of control.9 Contemporary interventions do not create evental changes; on the 
contrary, they produce changes without events, consequences without 
programs, itineraries without trails. The question is no longer whether the 
subaltern can speak, because everybody can speak. In fact, everybody must 
speak in order to survive. One must speak all the time in order to locate oneself 
in the field of war. One must speak so that she is not automatically seen as a 
threat and a target. 
     Thus, the paradox is that one must intervene in the field of war and yet one 
must also pass unnoticed. To put it in other terms, to survive is to accomplish a 
mission and at the same time remain peacefully static. To survive is to avoid 
being caught on camera in a permanently televised world. To survive is to 
delete the undeletable cookies of the computer; to avoid being shot when one 
crosses the street; to be somewhere else when a terrorist attack occurs; to 
withdraw the money before the investment fails; to be safe when a natural 
disaster wipes everything out. Contemporary Dasein is not being-there, but 
being-somewhere-else when something takes place. 
17
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      A further aspect of this paradoxical condition is that the reality of global war 
in which interventions take place is ultimately eventless. Even if the media 
constantly focus on the horrifying components of the war (from Bin Laden to 
Afghanistan, from Palestine to Ciudad Juárez, from Syria to Guantánamo), the 
perpetual war of globalization is characterized by the eerie calm of everyday 
life. Anxiety and fear are prevalent structures of feeling, but traumatic and 
violent events are surprisingly absent in global war. Or, more precisely, violence 
is experienced through the mediation of the media and so it always seems to hit 
other people. As Judith Butler observes, today violence seems to affect others 
even when it affects oneself: “Television coverage of war positions citizens as 
visual consumers of violent conflict that happens elsewhere … enforcing a 
sense of infinite distance from zones of war even for those who live in the 
midst of violence” (Butler 2010, xv). Visual mediatization makes you feel safe, 
it reassures you that you are watching violence, not living it. At the same time, 
it reproduces the sense of permanent threat: you sense that you’d better be 
careful or next time you will be on TV too. In the end, the function of media 
violence is to inculcate the imperative of survival among the population.10 
     The mediatization of war not only generates distance toward reality, but it 
also reveals and conceals the fact that war is the normal state of things. It is 
true that global war manifests itself through multiple forms that involve the 
technologies of surveillance, the digitalization of control, the disasters of the 
18
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 “shock doctrine” of capitalism, and all the incredible types of violence that we 
watch on TV and the Internet every day.11 But global war is less an existential 
or phenomenological experience than a spectral structure that organizes social 
life. Global war, in other words, is a condition that determines individual and 
collective destinies without materializing in a clear and visible way. Of course, I 
do not mean to deny that conflict and violence are very tangible phenomena 
for many peoples in the world. Neither do I want to repeat the worn-out 
description of postmodern war as a “virtual spectacle,” an approach that runs 
the risk of ignoring the actual realities of suffering. And it is not a matter either 
of assuming a transhistorical concept of violence or trying to measure the level 
of cruelty of global war in comparison with previous situations, as if one could 
compare, say, the Holocaust with today’s Mexican narco-wars. Rather, the 
crucial point is to understand that war unfolds more as a chronic condition of 
fear and as a state of exception than as real battle and combat. Under global 
war people continue to lead their normal lives precisely because war permeates 
the very fabric of social life.12  
     One short story by Catalan writer Quim Monzó, “Durant la guerra” ‘During 
the War,’ is a perfect portrait of the practice of everyday life under global war. 
In it, a group of citizens become aware that a war has begun despite the fact 
that no government has officially declared it and no military action has taken 
place. The irrefutable sign that indicates the beginning of the war is that 
19
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 everybody acts as if nothing happened, and they keep a “calma (aparentment 
apparent)” ‘(ostensibly ostensible) calm’ (Monzó 1999, 619; Bush 2011, 113). It 
seems that the conflict resulted from the “enfrontament entre dues faccions 
(no declaradament antagòniques) de l’exèrcit” ‘a confrontation between two 
factions (that weren’t openly antagonistic) within the army’ (620; 114). But 
none of the factions are interested in publicizing the fight: the winning side 
wants a discreet victory, and the victims do not want to have to admit defeat.  
     Symptomatically, radio and TV stations do not inform audiences about the 
conflict. They continue to program classical music, an Elvis Presley movie, a 
soap opera in which one of the leading characters reveals that he is gay, and the 
reports of a workers’ demonstration and of the seven victims of a rugby match 
in which fans of the two teams began to fight. This situation of tension and 
misinformation lasts for years and years, until one day one of the citizens 
announces that the war finished that afternoon “tan inopinadament com hav ia 
començat” ‘as unexpectedly as it had begun’ (627; 119). Some citizens celebrate 
the event, but others become even more worried. They know that wars are 
hard, but that post-wars are even harder, and the peace treaty that had just been 
signed “en marcava inapel·lablement l’inici” ‘was an ineluctable indicator that 
the post-war period had started’ (627; 119). 
     Is this state of permanent fear but of ostensibly ostensible calm not our 
ordinary experience of global war? Even though we are constantly exposed to 
20
Décalages, Vol. 2 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 23
https://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol2/iss1/23
 all types of disasters and violent conflicts as they take place in the world, the 
overexposure also dissolves the traumatic reality of war, so that we are 
condemned to act as if nothing happened. To put it bluntly, the total 
mobilization of total war has been replaced by the apparent futility of global 
war. Global war is the dark obverse of globalization, but global peace is the 
even darker side of global war. 
 
From the Subaltern Other to Internal Singularity 
     Three pressing questions result from the shift from recognition to survival: 
Is there something we can do in this futile global war other than trying to 
survive? Is there any available political form of disruption that does not 
reproduce the logic of war? If the subaltern was the locus of defiance to the 
cultural logic of late capitalism, how must we conceive spaces of 
nonconformity and acts of disobedience under the war logic of global 
capitalism? 
     In this new conjuncture, the (non-)work of the subaltern is replaced by the 
emergence of local singularities that produce some type of short-circuit in the 
immanence of global war. Singularities establish a common field that is 
inherent to the world of war and yet disrupts this immanence of the glocal. 
Disruption should not be interpreted as interruption or delinking, let alone 
denunciation or resistance. Rather, singular short-circuits or, to use Badiou’s 
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 terms, the forcing or torsion of truths, present new political constituencies. 
They create events that are open and unique, generic and unreproducible, 
transparent and enigmatic. In a certain way, these events just emerge, like a 
mushroom in the forest or a cactus in the middle of the desert. 
     Rather than Badiou’s conceptualization of evental sites, however, it is 
Althusser’s earlier notion of aleatory events that provides a theory more 
attuned to the singularities that emerge in the “eventless” global war. As is 
known, Althusser analyzed the way that Marxism dismantled the Hegelian 
inscription of all particulars in a universal explanatory structure. The Marxist 
rewriting of historical dialectics transformed particular situations into singular 
and overdetermined conjunctures that were not the expression of a spiritual 
principle but the complex unity of structures and their effects. For Althusser, 
singularities are not the product of teleological universal laws like Hegel’s 
concrete universals, but aleatory events whose causes are immanent to their 
effects. Althusser uses two main terms to describe the (non-)causes of 
singularities. Depending on whether he wants to emphasize the structural 
causality in which they are inscribed or whether he wants to stress the 
contingency of their moment of appearance, singular events are alternatively 
interpreted as a dislocation or “décalage” (Althusser 2006b, 104) or as an 
“irruption” or “surgissement” (1996, 61).13 
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      Event, intervention and singularity have become dominant notions in 
thinking a non-teleological logic of history. One particular aspect has been 
decisive: the openness of the intervention or, in other words, the emptiness of 
the event. Against the teleological template of Hegelianism and of previous, 
“dogmatic” versions of Marxism for which the content of historical events was 
determined by the proletarian road to socialism, Althusser put forward what he 
termed “the void essential to any aleatory encounter” (2006a, 202), that is, the 
unpredictability and openness of singular events and political interventions. 14  
     And yet within post-Althusserianism other general contents and encoded 
premises have determined the meaning of interventions and events. These 
premises are in turn connected to the logic of recognition of postmodernity. 
Let us briefly examine this connection in the rewriting of singular events by 
three prominent post-Althusserians: Laclau, Rancière, and Badiou. 
     Laclau argues that the articulation of social heterogeneity needs a singular 
element that can act as an empty signifier and establish a chain of equivalences 
between the diverse political demands in a given conjuncture: “This is why an 
equivalential chain has to be expressed through the cathexis of a singular 
element: because we are dealing not with a conceptual operation of finding an 
abstract common feature underlying all social grievances, but with a 
performative operation constituting the chain as such” (Laclau 2005, 97). Here 
singularities are empty elements that are immanent to the social field, and 
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 therefore the content of political interventions cannot be programmed or 
predetermined. 
     And yet Laclau predetermines not the content but the form of the political 
by conceiving politics as the articulation of a demand and as the expression of a 
social grievance. In this respect, his formal conception of political singularities 
is entwined in a logic of recognition, as it is assumed that politics are the 
struggle to articulate and recognize demands. Whether actual claims end up 
being satisfied or not does not matter as much as the fact that the political itself 
adopts the frame of the claim and the demand. Politics, in other words, have 
more to do with the expression and recognition of existing grievances than 
with anti-systemic torsions and future transformations.  
     Similarly, for Rancière (1999), singularities emerge in the universal space of 
the part of the no-part. He conceives political interventions as interruptions of 
the police order by way of a political demand of the excluded. The part of 
those who have no part embodies the egalitarian logic that calls for the 
inclusion of the excluded into the police order, even though this eventual 
inclusion will prompt the collapse of the established order. Thus, Rancière 
bases his conception of political events on an egalitarian logic that also 
implicates a structure of demand. The antinomy between the police order and 
the part of the no-part can also be related to the historical moment of 
multicultural inclusion and subaltern exclusion. After all, the part of the no-
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 part, like the aporetic subaltern, are ethical rather than political figures. They 
disrupt an unjust order in the name of justice; they promise forms of liberation 
in the name of equality, hospitality, or recognition. These ethical premises seem 
to overdetermine their political content. 
     Badiou disentangles singularities from both an egalitarian logic and a 
structure of demand. For him, singularities generate real change by bringing 
into being the inexistent in a given situation. In Logics of Worlds, Badiou 
distinguishes between “weak” and “strong” singularities to specify that, while a 
weak singularity has non-maximal consequences over the situation, a strong 
singularity can “be recognized by the fact that its consequences in the world is 
to make exist within it the proper inexistent of the object-site” (Badiou 2009, 
377). The “inexistent” is not exactly Badiou’s equivalent term for the part of 
the no-part, but it intersects with Rancière’s concept to the extent that it is also 
that excluded element that, when it emerges, transforms the situation in a 
radical way.15 
     Badiou underlines the consequences of evental singularities. For him, the 
inexistent is neither immanent to the situation (as it is not one of its existing 
elements), nor is it transcendental to it (as it does not follow an abstract logic, 
such as the logic of equality). Instead, the inexistent only comes into being as a 
specific intervention in a concrete situation. However, even though Badiou lays 
the emphasis on the transformative consequences of events rather than on the 
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 naming of the excluded part, his thinking of singularity continues to follow the 
model of inclusion and exclusion. While the inexistent is not an unnameable 
moment or a structural impasse but an occasion of transformation and change, 
Badiou assumes the premise of the logic of recognition that stipulates that the 
excluded becomes included and that the outside traverses the inside, in this 
case through the appearance of being and event. 
     But the basis or argument of “exclusion” is not as useful as it was under the 
cultural logic of late capitalism. One of the terrifying effects of global war is 
precisely that it does not exclude anyone. Within this structure of war, there is 
no part of the no part anymore and we are all fundamentally equal. Naturally, 
this does not mean that inequality and domination are not omnipresent. The 
point is rather that the main antagonism that traverses and constitutes the 
political no longer involves a closed order versus the excluded or inexistent 
part. It now seems to correspond to a different opposition: the antagonism 
between war and freedom. 
     Thus, in a situation in which exclusion itself has been excluded, singularities 
constitute acts of pure freedom not linked to a position of structural barring. 
They do not result from putting forward an egalitarian, inclusionary logic but 
from being the product of a desire for freedom. The desire for freedom 
manifests itself as escape from a state of oppression. As an original and 
generative desire for liberation, freedom always entails breaking away from a 
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 dominant situation or a subjugating power. After all, the founding of freedom 
in the Greek polis was not only the result of an original, self-generating desire, 
but also of the victory against despotic Persia in the battle of Salamis. As Plato 
reminds us in The Laws, it was the fear of becoming slaves of the despotic laws 
of the Persians and of their Greek ancestors that gathered the Athenians to 
fight against the invaders and found the free polis (Plato 1988, 698b-699b). 
Given this linkage between freedom and fighting, the singular instances of 
liberation do not interrupt or oppose the order of global war; on the contrary, 
they fold up onto the same logic of conflict. Singularities of freedom do not 
cancel the state of war but have an immanent and yet dramatic relation to it. 
     Freedom, in other words, does not correspond to the dialectical counterpart 
of war, peace. Peace assumes that there is a difference between the spaces of 
the friend and the spaces of the enemy, so that the end of the war can 
represent, as Schmitt puts it, the “retreat [of the enemy] into his borders only” 
(Schmitt 1996, 36). The end of war is ultimately nothing other than this retreat. 
But given the vanishing of the friend/enemy distinction in global war, peace, 
let alone the utopia of perpetual peace, are uncertain and undefined. 
     For this reason, freedom cannot be celebrated as a pristine ethical notion 
like equality. The antagonism between war and freedom is muddled and 
paradoxical. Freedom is good and bad at the same time: the desire for 
liberation is noble, but the fight to achieve it is dangerous. To escape a system 
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 of oppression is liberating, but it also leaves behind those who remain 
subjugated or it imposes change on those who do not want change. Freedom is 
a political creature, always involved in war operations, equally available to 
progressive and reactionary collectives. To mention a few current examples: the 
Occupy movement wants freedom from corporations, but the Tea Party also 
wants freedom from the corporate government; the Arab Spring wanted 
freedom for the people, but Islamic fundamentalists also want to free their 
countries from Western influence; the Catalans want freedom from Spain, but 
the Spanish government calls their desire for freedom a selfish act. 
     Singular acts of freedom inevitably generate acts of war and yet do not 
simply reproduce war. They take place both inside and outside war, in a field of 
immanent contiguity that simultaneously continues and negates conflict. They 
do not interrupt the system but they do not reproduce it either. They are not 
radical change but they are not war politics as usual. They are not made of only 
the desire of bodies, but they do not obey an abstract logic either. They are, o f 
course, purely singular, and only materialize through concrete interventions and 
effective practices. They are as ineffable as they are irreducibly real. The 
movements of freedom that occur within global war are internal 
rearrangements of an established phase of the system. They are not the utopian 
seeds of a different future nor the transitional steps of an interregnum, but 
singular events in and against a situation of global eventlessness. 
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     In this situation, it is seemingly impossible to determine whether the 
intervention of a free singularity opposes the logic of the system or whether it 
reproduces it. And yet the planetary dimension of global capitalism and global 
war turn this Marxist dilemma into a pressing and inevitable one. How must we 
solve this dilemma, or even just pose it as a question, in our global 
conjuncture? 
     Galli observes that “the temporal vectors and spatial architectures of 
modern politics” are not capable of explaining globalization, which he defines 
as “that ensemble of processes in which all the tensions of modernity explode” (2010, 103). 
Galli locates Marxism among these outmoded political concepts, as it simply 
offers a “monocausal reading of globalization” (102). 
     Galli is right when he says that globalization has caused a general conceptual 
implosion and that reality can no longer be described with clear and distinct 
ideas. And it is true as well that Marxism’s “great class war … is unrecognizable 
today” (175). Also evident, however, is that we have no other option but to 
continue using the concepts that we have inherited from classical and modern 
political philosophy to describe our present. The very idea of war, for instance, 
is equally problematic as an analytical category. War is apparently a self-evident 
notion and, in the context of the war on terror, seems to provide an accurate 
29
Illas: Survival Global War
Published by OxyScholar, 2016
 description of the reality of the world. Then again, as Galli himself would 
accept, in a situation in which war has no limits and has become 
indistinguishable from society itself, the concept of war also loses its own 
explanatory meaning. Without the possibility of differentiating between friend 
and enemy and between an exceptional state of war and a normal state of 
peace, war cannot be an operative concept. Or, rather, war, as well as all 
concepts of political philosophy, can only be used “under erasure,” that is, 
knowing that meaning is ultimately spectral and differed. 
     But Galli himself presents global war as the obverse of economic 
globalization, and he notices that, symptomatically, 9/11 has been most 
remembered not for the attack on the Pentagon (symbol of state power) but 
for the collapse of the Twin Towers in the “economic acropolis” of Wall Street  
(174). In fact, we can add that, after 2008, financial crisis has replaced the war 
on terror as the central thematic conflict of global war, and this shift has made 
the economic nature of the beast even more visible. In this respect, the 
immediacy between war, politics and capital is not a reason to dismiss Marxism 
as a reductive template but the opposite: Marxism provides a systematic set of 
concepts that explain the economic nature of the contradictions of our 
conjuncture. Rather than surrendering with a melancholic tone and a  sense of 
defeat after the global implosion of ideas and languages, it seems more 
productive to continue the task of inventing new concepts by reworking those 
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 passages of the past that help us illuminate and intervene in the present. The 
systemic logic of capitalism analyzed by the Marxist tradition continues to be 
indispensable in the understanding of global war as a form of appearance of the 
mode of production. 
     For this reason, the thinking of singular events cannot be disentangled from 
the thinking on the economic structure. While, as we have seen in Laclau, 
Rancière and Badiou, post-Althusserianism has tended to adopt the non-
teleological logic of the event but has replaced the economic structural causality 
with other “structural” premises related to equality, inclusion/exclusion and 
recognition, the new logic of survival of the global capitalist war compels us to 
go back to Althusser’s notion of event as both a contingent irruption and a 
structural dislocation. The tension between singularity and structure, between 
contingency and determination by the last economic instance, seems much 
more attuned to the new antagonism between acts of freedom and structures of 
war that traverses what Warren Montag has called “the global necro-economy” 
(Montag 2009, 138). 
      Althusser left no politics to replace the proletarian road to socialism. On 
the contrary, his lesson is that the content of the political can never be 
predetermined. Multiple singular political acts within global war pursue forms 
of survival that are a liberation and an escape from the constructive-destructive 
machine of war. They are not preprogramed progressive movements, but they 
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 do aim to free individuals and collectives from the control of capital. To 
survive is to engage in open, empty, aleatory interventions that are also 
produced by, and directed against, the structural logic of capitalist war. 
     The articulation of a chain of equivalences between survival, singularity and 
freedom is a possible path for present transformative and combative politics. 
Jameson ends his analysis of the cultural logic of late capitalism with the mot to, 
“We have to name the system” (1991, 418). After the shifting of valences from 
culture to war, perhaps a new slogan is needed: “We are at war with the 
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Notes 
     1 Hardt and Negri’s ambiguity may be indicative of the fact that the 
Foucauldian biopolitics from which they derive the notion of biopolitical war 
describes the total wars of the twentieth century but is not so useful to explain 
the nature of warfare within globalization. I will return to this point below. 
     2 See also Clausewitz 1976. 
     3 See also Aron 1954. 
     4 Other terms that describe the new structure of productive violence are 
Warren Montag’s “necro-economics” (Montag 2005 and 2009) and Robert  P. 
Marzec’s “militariality” (Marzec 2009). For an excellent analysis of recent works 
on war and capitalism, see Balakrishnan 2009. 
     5 For studies on the logic of recognition, see, among others, Taylor et al. 
1994; Fraser 1997; and Markell 2003. 
     6 For studies on trauma and writing, see, among others, Caruth 1996; 
LaCapra 2001; and Felman and Laub 1992. 
     7 For Schmitt’s geneaology of katechon, see Schmitt 2006, 59-66. 
     8 Given that biopolitics are no longer the explanatory horizon of the 
political field, the logic of survival does not correspond either to Agamben’s 
notion of “bare life” referring to the capture of life by sovereign biopower. 
Similarly, the concentration camp, which for Agamben represents the 
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biopolitical space or “nomos” of the modern (Agamben 1998, 166-80), cannot 
exemplify the social project of destructive construction within global war. 
     9 As is known, Deleuze defined control as a modulation: “controls are a 
modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one 
moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to 
point” (Deleuze 1991, 4). 
     10 For analyses of the relation between media and war, see Mitchell 2011; 
and Der Derian 2009. 
     11 For a study of the shock doctrine of capitalism, see Klein 2007. 
     12 In describing contemporary violence, Slavoj Žižek has distinguished 
between the subjective form (the epiphenomena of terrorism, crime, conflict, 
etc.), the symbolic form (the very imposition of a universe of meaning), and the 
objective form (the systemic violence of capitalism) (Žižek 2008, 1-2). While his 
analysis is very illuminating, my emphasis here is on the dominant political 
form or typology of war that adopts the inherent violence of the system and on 
the relationship of immanence between the two. 
     13 Althusser develops his thinking of singular events in multiple texts, but 
see especially 2006b, 91-118 and 182-198; 1996, 57-64; “Contradiction and 
Overdetermination” in 2005a, 87-128; 2005b; and “The Underground Current 
of the Materialism of the Encounter” and the interviews with Fernanda 
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Navarro in 2006a, 163-207 and 251-89. For important reflections on the 
encounter and dislocation/“décalage” of events without destiny, see Montag 
2010 and 2013, 190-208.  
     14 For an analysis of the Machiavellian geneaology of the emptiness of 
Althusser’s event, see Del Lucchese 2013. 
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